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I. INTRODUCTION
The topic of this year's International Law Weekend, "The United States
and International Law: Legal Traditions and Future Possibilities," cries out for
additional historical perspective. This may, at least initially, sound like a
surprising claim. Conversations about the relationship between the United
States (U.S.) and International Law seem saturated with history. Advocates of
American participation in the International Criminal Court and opponents of
Bush Administration tactics in the war on terror, both harken back to American
sponsorship of the Nuremberg tribunals to support their views. The names of
obscure World War 1-era cases like Quirin,' Eisentrager,2 and Hirota3 roll off
the tongues of lawyers debating the Bush Administration's tactics in the war on
terror. More generally, foreign affairs law and foreign affairs law scholars
often seemed obsessed with history---even compared to constitutional law
scholars. We pour over nineteenth century prize cases,4 long-forgotten inter-
national incidents,5 and long-lost treatises on the law of war.6 We bandy around
* Assistant Professor, University of Georgia School of Law; J.D., New York University School
of Law 2003; M.A. History, Yale University 2000; B.A., Yale University 1998. Thank you to organizers of
International Law Weekend (ILW) and to my fellow panel members, Elizabeth Borgwardt, John Witt, Dan
Hulsebosch, and David Golove, for the opportunity to put this panel together.
1. Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
2. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
3. Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197 (1949).
4. See, e.g., Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. 37 (1800); Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) 64 (1804); The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 101-02 (1825).
5. See, e.g., Anthony J. Colangelo, 'De Facto Sovereignty': Boumediene and Beyond, GEO.
WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (discussing Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202 (1890), a case
concerning jurisdiction over murder committed on a disputed guano island).
6. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557,590-608 (2006) (quoting extensivelyfrom "[tlhe
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the names of long-dead scholars like Grotius, Vattel, and Bynkershoek as if
they were close personal friends. Even foreign affairs law doctrine gives
history a role, recognizing the force of longstanding political branch practice.7
And yet, the work of the four scholars on this panel-Elizabeth Borgwardt,
Associate Professor of History at Washington University in St. Louis, John
Fabian Witt, Professor of Law and History at Columbia Law School, David
Golove, Hiller Family Foundation Professor of Law at New York University
School of Law, and Daniel Hulsebosch, Professor at New York University
School of Law-highlight how little we really know about the history of
American perspectives on international law. Largely lost amongst the history
of American diplomacy and warcraft, foreign affairs caselaw and doctrinal
development is the rich cultural and intellectual history of American engage-
ment with international law and justice. What is international law? Is it a
progressive tool to achieve American goals and ideals, a means of negotiating
cooperative solutions to transnational problems, or an illegitimate foreign
attempt to constrain U.S. power? Different Americans, at different times, have
held these and other more complex views of international law. Debates
between these views have had major impact on the shape of international
institutions and American engagement with them. Yet very little of this is
captured by the more traditional legal histories.
American conceptions of international justice and ideas of American
mission have long helped shape international law and institutions. Conceptions
of American national identity, in turn, have been deeply influenced by
international law and by American perceptions of it, both positive and negative.
This history of ideas begins to bring the dynamic relationship between the
United States and international law, its history and its potential future, truly into
focus. These scholars, along with others, have begun to explore the history of
these ideas. There is much more to be done.
This short discussion describes some of the real, powerful contributions
this new type of historical scholarship can make to our understanding of
American relations with international law and the rest of the world. In
particular, it focuses on three specific contributions: enriching and improving
our historical picture of American relations to international law, complicating
the common stereotypes of that relationship that dominate current debates, and
classic treatise penned by Colonel William Winthrop, whom we have called 'the 'Blackstone of Military
Law."" (internal citation omitted)).
7. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.
concurring) ("[i]n short, a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the
Congress and never before questioned, engaged in by Presidents who have also sworn to uphold the
Constitution, making as it were such exercise of power part of the structure of our government, may be treated
as a gloss on 'executive Power' vested in the President by § I of Art. II.").
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facilitating study of various theories of international law, particularly
constructivist ones. It also serves as a call for more scholarship in the area.8
II. MISSING PIECES
Scholarship on American ideas about international law and justice seeks to fill
a major gap in the legal literature. Despite voluminous scholarship on the
history of the United States and international law, the intellectual history of
American perceptions of, engagement with, and contributions to international
law remain amazingly underdeveloped.
The grand majority of legal-history scholarship on the United States and
international law focuses on the history of U.S. Foreign Affairs law.9 This
scholarship tends to focus on one of two sets of questions. The first is how
various Constitutional provisions that concern foreign affairs, e.g., the treaty
clause,' o the declare war clause," the foreign commerce clause, 2 the define-
and-punish clause, 3 and the ambassador clauses, 4 have historically been
interpreted and how those clauses incorporate, ignore, or otherwise respond to
international law. The second set explores questions typical of diplomatic
history by asking how various American leaders have interpreted, followed, or
violated international law in their practice of foreign affairs and war. 5 The
importance of both sets of questions has only been enhanced by recent events
and controversies-the fight against global terror has raised difficult
constitutional and international law questions-and nothing in this discussion
should be understood as diminishing the importance of this work in any way.
But read alone, these histories present a distorted and potentially
dangerous picture of American perspectives on international law. One problem
with the focus of these histories is that it tends to encourage a picture of the
United States and international law as in opposition, as two distinct entities
eyeballing each other across a rift (to some, that rift might look like the Atlantic
8. For more discussion of some of these issues, see generally Harlan Grant Cohen, The American
Challenge to International Law: A Tentative Framework for Debate, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 551 (2003).
9. This is to be contrasted with more strictly historical scholarship, in which the intellectual and
cultural history of American foreign policy has been extensively explored. Scholars of international and
American foreign affairs law would be well-served to engage with this historical work.
10. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
11. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
12. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
13. Id. art. 1, § 8, cl. 10.
14. Id. art. ll § 2, cl. 2., art. IL § 3.
15. As a note, one result of this focus on U.S. Foreign Affairs law is that American views of
international law are rarely placed in the context of scholarship on international law history rather than
scholarship on American history.
2009]
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Ocean), sometimes embracing, sometimes ignoring each other, sometimes in
conflict. In these histories, the Constitution's text treats international law in
some way; American leaders choose to follow or not to follow international
law's precepts. Such a distinction between the two is clearly overdrawn.
International law is not an entity, but an idea or set of ideas. While some
Americans at some times may have been opposed to those ideas, others have
believed deeply in them, and still others have helped shape them. It is strange
to talk about the United States as a state, having any kind of distinct
relationship with them. But this oppositional view, even if misperceived, can
be quite dangerous, lending support to some commonly-held views about
American exceptionalism, a concern that will be discussed in the next section.
These sorts of histories also tend to overemphasize a particular conception
of international law: international law as a body of rules either to be observed
or violated, an "International Law" in quotation marks. In these histories, the
question is usually how a particular rule of international law is treated, either
by the Constitutional text or by American leaders. Although international law
can be described, at any given point, as a collection of rules on particular
subjects, at least historically, international law has been much more than just
a set of blackletter rules (if anything, blackletter rules often seen maddeningly
missing). A broader, better understanding of international law would place
those rules in their larger context, as part of a constantly evolving set of ideas
and normative commitments about international relations, justice, and
governance. To truly understand the complex relationship between Americans
and international law, one must look not only at legal developments, but at
discussions of American mission and Manifest Destiny, anti-slave trade
movements, 6 immigrant anti-colonialism, 7 the international peace movement,'8
Jacksonian isolationism, 9 and the development of various American foreign
policies from the Monroe Doctrine to Wilsonianism to Containment. Many of
these ideas are only tangentially related to specific international law rules.
Often, those who developed, held, and discussed these ideas did so in non-legal
language, citing religious imperatives, international morality, global justice, or
realpolitik.2" Nonetheless, these ideas have consistently shaped American
16. See generally Jenny S. Martinez, Antislavery Courts and the Dawn of International Human
Rights Law, 117 YALE L.J. 550 (2008).
17. See generally MATTHEW FRYE JACOBSON, SPECIAL SORROWS: THE DIASPORIC IMAGINATION
OF IRISH, POLISH, AND JEWISH IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES (Harvard Univ. Press ed. 1995).
18. See John Fabian Witt, Crystal Eastman and the Internationalist Beginnings ofAmerican Civil
Liberties, 54 DUKE L.J. 705, 729-33 (2004) [hereinafter John Fabian Witt].
19. See Walter Russell Mead, The Jacksonian Tradition andAmerican Foreign Policy, 58 NAT'L
INTEREST 5 (1999).
20. See Cohen, supra note 8, at 556-60.
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perceptions of international law and have informed various Americans in their
attempts to reform the international system, develop new rules of international
law, and create new international institutions. Understanding the diverse
positions the United States has taken toward international law in the past, e.g.,
support for the creation of the United Nations and the Nuremberg Tribunal but
opposition to the League of Nations and the International Criminal Court,
requires a fuller understanding of how each of those institutions either
resonated or was in tension with other ideological commitments of particular
groups ofAmericans. Predicting the positions future American administrations
might take on international law and institutions requires a deeper understanding
of international law's place within competing foreign policy ideas and
philosophies.
But more important than its narrowness and inaccuracy is the ability of this
description of international law to distort our understanding of American
perceptions of international law over time. If international law is perceived as
no more than a body of specific laws, then the relationship between the United
States and international law can take one of only two forms, compliance or non-
compliance. And not surprisingly, the traditional histories focus on specific
moments when the choice had to be made between compliance and non-
compliance. It is difficult, however, to extrapolate more durable U.S. positions
on international law from these moments of crisis.2' First, violations of
international law are almost certainly overrepresented in these histories. By
definition, these moments are ones where possible violation of the rule has been
placed on the table for consideration. Missing are more general patterns of
compliance. International law might be most successful when its precepts are
so deeply internalized by international actors as to make the question of
compliance or non-compliance unthinkable-the question is simply taken off
the table. As a result though, true compliance may mean no discussion of the
rule at all. Most compliance may thus be invisible to history (or at least
difficult to discern). Second, these moments of crisis present the most powerful
possible reasons for violating an international law rule, most notably, national
survival.22 It is unremarkable to find that legal rules will be under the most
strain during these moments. As a result, moments of crisis tell us little about
the more ordinary perceptions of the rule. Even the most human rights
21. Cf David M. Golove, Leaving CustomaryInternationalLaw Where itls, 34 GA.J. INT'L COMP.
L. 333, 348-50 (2006) [hereinafter Golove] (making a similar point about the case studies used in JACK L.
GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMrrs OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 45-78 (2005)).
22. Cf. Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CAL. L. REV.
1823, 1883-86 (2002) (noting that compliance may be less likely in situations involving national security
where the cost of compliance may seem higher than those of violation).
2009]
ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law
respecting states have committed horrible acts in defense of national security.2 3
Most of all, moments of compliance or noncompliance fail to capture the
complex processes by which the rules and institutions of international law are
created, debated, transformed, and sustained. They fail to capture the complex
role the United States and Americans have had in helping to shape international
law as well as the ways international law has influenced American national
identity.
A number of scholars, including those on this panel, have begun to remedy
the situation by focusing less on historical conflicts over international laws and
more on the intellectual history of conceptions of international law. Mark
Janis, for example, has tracked the transfer of ideas about international law
from British scholars like Blackstone and Jeremy Bentham to American
scholars like Joseph Story, James Kent, and Henry Wheaton. 24 He has also
explored the longstanding influence of American religion and religious
movements on American conceptions of international law and justice and the
lasting imprints those movements have made on the international law rules
passed down to today.25 Mary Dudziak has written about the complex
relationship between the global Cold War politics and the success of the civil
rights movement in the United States.26 Jonathan Zasloff has focused on the
lawyer-statesmen like Elihu Root and Henry Stimson, who dominated American
foreign policy during the first half of the 20th Century.27 Each brought their
domestic legal training to their new foreign policy roles and in the process,
transmuted then-current ideas about domestic law into American foreign policy.
Elizabeth Borgwardt, Daniel Hulsebosch, David Golove, and John Fabian
Witt are all engaged in similar projects. Elizabeth Borgwardt has previously
written about the role of domestic New Deal ideas in the shaping of the post-
23. The United Kingdom, United States, France, and Israel, for example, have all been accused of
using torture to fight terrorism. See generally Ir. v. U.K., 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), 96 (1978) (United
Kingdom); COMM'N OF INQUIRY INTO THE ACTIONS OF CANADIAN OFFICIALS IN RELATION TO MAHER ARAR,
REPORT OF THE EVENTS RELATING TO MAHER ARAR: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 (2006),
http://www.csars-sirc.gc.ca/pdfs/cm-arar-rec-eng.pdf(last visited Mar. 20,2009) (United States); EI-Masri
v. United States, 479 F.3d 296,300 (4th Cir. 2007); THE BATTLE OF ALGIERS (Casbah Films, Igor Film 1966)
(France); HCJ 5100/94 Pub. Comm. Against Torture v. Isr. [ 1999] IsrSC 46(2) (Israel). Such torture may be
an inexcusable violation of international law, but its use may not be the best indicator of each state's full
commitment to or perception of human rights law, let alone the international rule of law more generally.
24. See generally MARK WESTON JANIS, THE AMERICAN TRADITION OF INTERNATIONAL LAw:
GREAT EXPECTATIONS 1789-1914 (2004).
25. Id.
26. See generally MARY L. DuODZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2002).
27. See generally Jonathan Zasloff, Law andthe Shaping ofAmerican Foreign Policy: The Twenty
Years' Crisis, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 583 (2004); Jonathan Zasloff, Law and the Shaping ofAmerican Foreign
Policy: From the Gilded Age to the New Era, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 239 (2003).
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World War II international system.2" In her retelling, the Atlantic Charter and
its four freedoms represented a New Deal manifesto for the world, marrying
civil and political rights (freedom of speech and religion) to economic and
social rights (freedom from want and fear).29 Franklin Delano Roosevelt and
his fellow New Dealers brought a positive, pragmatic vision of the role
government and institutions could play in rebuilding and managing the world;
and the experience of the Depression, the New Deal, and World War H created
the domestic base of support for such actions that had been notably missing
during the League of Nations campaign following World War 1.30 The postwar
international machinery-the United Nations, the Bretton Woods system, and
the Nuremberg tribunals-were the products of these American ideas and
realities.3 Borgwardt's current project looks at the fate of those postwar
institutions, particularly the Nuremberg principles and the core human rights
treaties. Here though, the story changes from one of American influence on
international law to one of international law's influence on the United States.
Borgwardt's new project, "The Rise and Rise of the Nuremberg Principles
'Constitutionalizing' Wartime Reconfigurations of Sovereignty," seeks to
explain the expanding influence of human rights in the face of Cold War
domestic opposition to human rights treaties.32
David Golove and Daniel Hulsebosch look at this kind of cross-influence
between American and international law ideas during an earlier period. Their
project, "The Status of the Law of Nations in the Early American Republic,"
places the U.S. Constitution and the early Republic into its wider Atlantic
context.33 One aspect of the project is to explore the foreign affairs role and
impact of the U.S. Constitution. As they explain, one key purpose of the
Constitution was to establish the United States as an independent member of the
international community of states, capable of self-governance, ready for
diplomacy, and able to ratify and abide by agreements. The Constitution was
designed to impress potential allies and trading partners.34 This experiment, in
28. Seegenerally ELIZABETH BORGWARDT, ANEW DEAL FORTHE WORLD: AMERICA'S VISION FOR
HuMAN RIGHTS (2005) [hereinafter BORGWARDT].
29. BORGWARDT, supra note 28 at 250-285.
30. See id. at 28.
31. Id.
32. Elizabeth Borgwardt, Remarks on the "Historical American Perspectives on International Law"
panel at International Law Weekend 2008 (Oct. 18, 2008).
33. David Golove & Daniel Hulsebosch, Remarks on the "Historical American Perspectives on
International Law" panel at International Law Weekend 2008 (Oct. 18, 2008).
34. As well as to rectify the mistakes ofthe Articles ofConfederation: state recalcitrance in relation
to treaties, foreign policy, and the law of nations was met with the Supremacy Clause, federal court
jurisdiction over treaties, ambassadors, etc., and the centralization of foreign affairs authority in the federal
government.
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turn, had lasting effects on international law, as other new states followed the
constitution-writing path to independence. At the same time, Golove and
Hulsebosch explain, the Constitution was itself deeply influenced by the law of
nations. This second aspect of their project traces the path of many
international law ideas into constitutional doctrine: the law of nations' status
as "higher" law was transferred to the Constitution. Ideas aboutjudicial review
first applied to the law of nations were eventually applied to the Constitution."
In an earlier project, John Witt focused on Crystal Eastman's transforma-
tion from American labor advocate to international peace activist to civil
libertarian, and explored the internationalist origins of the American civil rights
movement.36 Witt described how turn-of-the-twentieth-century Americans
joined in the general fervor for international law and governance that swept the
world in the years surrounding the 1899 and 1904 Hague Conventions, the
establishment of the Permanent Court for International Arbitration, and other
positive developments in international governance.37 While some, like Elihu
Root and the other founders of the American Society of International Law, saw
these developments as proof of the power of international law as a means of
mediating between states, Crystal Eastman and other members of the
international peace movement saw these developments as the triumphs of
cosmopolitanism.38 The international peace movement they joined would link
citizens of the world and vindicate their rights against the tyranny of states.39
When World War I made membership in the international peace movement
politically unacceptable in the United States, many of the movement's former
leaders refocused their efforts on domestic civil liberties, creating the
organization that would eventually become the American Civil Liberties
Union.40
John Witt's current project is similarly concerned with the ways inter-
national law has helped shape American ideals and self-image. In this project,
Witt argues that since early in U.S. history, Americans have been torn between
two visions of the international law of war: an enlightenment law of war that
sought to regulate the conduct of war and minimize humanitarian harm, and an
earlier "just war" tradition that legitimated actions based on the justice of either
side's cause. Both traditions are at work in the Civil War-era Lieber Code, Witt
argues. On the one hand, the Code codified humanitarian rules applicable to all
35. As an example of the former, Golove and Hulsebosch point specifically to Rutgers v.
Waddington (N.Y. Mayor's Court 1784).
36. See generally John Fabian Witt, supra note 18.
37. See id. at 725-30.
38. See id. at 730-33.
39. See id. at 731-33.
40. See id. at 746-50.
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sides of the conflict. On the other, it authorized some of the most brutal of
Union tactics during the final stages of the war. The tension between these two
impulses-one towards law and the other towards justice-survives to this day,
and it is the seeming conflict between them, Witt argues, that has animated
many of the most difficult debates over American war-fighting.4
All four of these scholars are thus beginning to provide a fuller history of
the American relationship with international law and justice. The cultural and
intellectual history that emerges is far more complex than often presumed.
Americans and international law ideas have been deeply influenced by each
other and cannot be easily disentangled even when in seeming opposition. The
relationship between the United States and international law cannot be
understood solely in terms of legal rules, compliance, and non-compliance.
Instead, a deeper understanding of how international law responds to American
self-identity, American views of the role of the United States in the world, and
American conceptions of international justice is required.
III. BEYOND CARICATURE
Popular discussions of the relationship between the United States and
international law often fall back on a few common but dangerous memes about
that relationship. History of the type described here can help rectify and
complicate these too quickly drawn caricatures.
There are a few different caricatures of American relations to international
law. The first involves a tendency towards presentism. This caricature
essentializes current perceptions of American relations to international
law-for example, the view that the Bush Administration opposes international
law-and projects it back into the past, creating an almost inevitable chain from
the founding of the Republic to today.42 Depending on who's telling the story
and when, this presentism lends itself to an overly simplified and sometimes
dangerous picture of the United States as longstanding "champion" of
41. John Witt, Remarks on the "Historical American Perspectives on International Law" panel at
International Law Weekend 2008 (Oct. 18, 2008).
42. See, e.g., Mark C. Rahdert, Comparative ConstitutionalAdvocacy, 56 Am U. L. Rev. 553, 589
(2007) ("Contemporary negative reactions to the use of comparative constitutional precedent tap into a
longstanding tradition of exceptionalism and particularism in American attitudes toward foreign law.");
Edward Lazarus, A "Moral'" Foreign Policy That Ignores International Law?: The History and Ironies of
the U.S.'s Current View of Its Role In the World, FINDLAW'S WRIT, May 1, 2003,
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/lazarus/20030501 .html (last visited Mar. 20,2009) ("The recent surge of moral
thinking in U.S. foreign policy has longstanding roots in our national history and spirit-and indeed, in world
history. It's likely to be a feature of U.S. policy for a long time.").
Cohen2009]
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international law,43 or constant defender of American rather than European or
international values, or eternal opponent of international governance.
Whereas this first caricature essentializes the present, two other caricatures
essentialize apparent aspects of American identity or thinking. The latter two
are thus versions of American exceptionalism. One might be described as a
normative exceptionalism. Versions of this caricature emphasize the founders'
desire to break with the ways of the old world-to be a "city on a hill."
According to this caricature, the United States holds and has held different
values from other parts of the world. These values might include different, or
in some views greater, commitments to democracy, liberty, or individualism.45
One recent example argues that Americans are constitutionalists, viewing
popular sovereignty as the most legitimate source of law, while Europeans are
universalists, looking beyond democracy to universal fundamental rights.46
The second form of exceptionalism, by contrast, is almost anti-normative.
This caricature describes the United States as a holdout from international law
and institutions, a state only willing to abide by international law to the extent
it suits its interests. This view explains the different views that the United
43. See, e.g., Helen Stacy, Relational Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2029, 2053 (2002-2003)
("[Tihe United States has a longstanding presence in international human rights treaty negotiations and has
made significant contributions to the contours of human rights practice, policy, and action worldwide."); id.
at 2054 ("The longstanding nature of the relationship between the United States and the United Nations has
built a deep reservoir of shared human rights commitment."); Michael H. Posner & Peter J. Spiro, Adding
Teeth to United States Ratification of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: The International Human
Rights Conformity Act of 1993, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1209, 1213 (1993) ("Uncorrected derogation thus may
prompt serious and continuing international opprobrium at the same time as it undermines our standing as
a longstanding champion of human rights.").
44. John Winthrop, City Upon a Hill (1630), in MAJOR PROBLEMS IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
VOLUME I: To 1914, at 28-29 (Thomas G. Patterson ed., 1989) (1978); George Washington, Farewell
Address (1796), in MAJOR PROBLEMS IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY VOLUME I: To 1914, at 76 (Thomas
G. Patterson ed., 1989) ("Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none or a very remote
relation."). See also Paul W. Kahn, American Hegemony and International Law Speaking Law to Power:
Popular Sovereignty, Human Rights, and the New International Order, I CHI. J. INT'L L. 1, 4 (2000)
("America's relationship to the rest of the world still seems to us to be one of example: the 'city on a hill'
that the rest of the world is to imitate.").
45. Adam Liptak, US. Court is Now Guiding Fewer Nations, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2008, at Al
(.'It's American exceptionalism,' Professor [Eric] Posner added in an interview. 'The view going back 200
years is that we've figured it out and people should follow our lead."'); Steven G. Calabresi, "A Shining City
on a Hill": American Exceptionalism andthe Supreme Court's Practice ofRelying on Foreign Law, 86 B.U.
L. REV. 1335, 1373 ("Like it or not, Americans really are a special people with a special ideology that sets
us apart from all the other peoples of the Old and New Worlds.").
46. See generally Jed Rubenfeld, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971
(2004). See also ROBERT KAGAN, OF PARADISE AND POWER 3 (Alfred A. Knopf 2003) ("It is time to stop
pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world... Americans are from Mars
and Europeans are from Venus.").
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States has had of international law-support for the creation of the United
Nations but apparent contempt for it now, sponsorship of the Nuremberg
tribunal but opposition to the International Criminal Court, support for the
WTO but opposition to Kyoto-as no more than naked power politics and
blatant hypocrisy.47
Most international law scholars know that these caricatures are overdrawn
and are usually careful to couch them in those terms. Nonetheless, these memes
can be quite powerful and pervasive, particularly in more informal settings.
These caricatures are also quite dangerous, suggesting an inevitability in
American views of international law that can make progress difficult.
Normative exceptionalism becomes a defense against calls for cooperation or
compliance; an American tradition of pragmatism (or hypocrisy) becomes an
excuse in itself for unilateralism. Belief in longstanding American support for
international law obscures the real concerns of international law's opponents
and the equally long tradition of isolationism. Those holding this view may
also fail to recognize the importance of American violations, as each is swept
aside as a mere exception to the general rule of compliance.48 None of these
caricatures encourage the engagement with ideas necessary to move past
disagreements and to find common ground.
The type of history discussed here provides an antidote to these common
caricatures. Far from essentializing the present or certain American values,
these projects unearth a series of counter-stories of how different Americans,
at different times, translated ideas about American values into very different
views on international law and international justice. Early leaders of the
Republic turn to international law to protect the country's independence.49 New
Dealers translate their ideas about domestic justice into the Atlantic Charter and
postwar international institutions,5 but Cold War Americans retreat from
international agreements they fear might be used to undermine their values."
47. See, e.g., Moisrs Naim, Missing Links: The Hypocrisy Audit, FOREIGN POLICY, Sept./Oct.
2008, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4440 (last visited Mar. 20, 2009) ("Double
standards have always been a part of U.S. foreign policy."); JULIE A. MERTUS, BAIT AND SWITCH: HUMAN
RIGHTS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 1 (1st ed. 2004) ("The United States is in fact still leading the world on
human rights, but in the wrong direction, promoting short-term instrumentalism over long-term ethical
principles, double standards instead of fair dealing, and a fearful view of human nature over a more open
one."). Cf MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 20 (4th ed. 2006) ("Hypocrisy is rife in wartime
discourse, because it is especially important at such a time to appear in the right.").
48. More cynically, the notion that the United States is a longstanding supporter of international
law can become a shield against rightful criticism of United States actions. Each violation is justified by its
exceptional nature.
49. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
50. See BORGWARDT, supra note 28.
51. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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Early twentieth century rights advocates first look outside the United States to
world citizenship as a protection against governmental abuse, but eventually
discover the values they hold dear in American civil liberties.52 Americans
beset by war are torn between the justice of their cause and their commitment
to the law of war.53
Moreover, although each of these scholars tells stories that are uniquely
about the United States-the ways domestic politics and domestic political
ideologies have shaped American views of international law-theirs is at the
most a very different type of exceptionalism. The Americans they describe do
see international law through the lens of their own history, culture, and national
ideology. That history, culture, and national ideology are often the product of
international law ideas as well. Far from placing the United States outside of
international law, choosing how to deal with it, these scholars tell a story of
interaction and cross-fertilization in which the seams between international and
domestic ideas quickly disintegrate. In this sense, the American exceptionalism
they describe is one the United States shares with other international actors,
each of whom brings its own views of history to these problems. The United
States they describe is part of the project of international law (even when
seemingly opposed to it), not exempt from or outside of it.
IV. CONSTRUCTION ZONE
The type of historical project pursued by these scholars can also contribute
to our understanding of how and when states comply with international law.
These projects provide information useful in exploring various theories of
compliance, including three of the most popular: rationalism, liberalism, and
constructivism. Of all those theories, however, constructivism may be
benefitted most of all.
Of each of these theories of compliance, rationalism may seem to have the
least to gain from these sorts of historical studies. Rationalist theories (there
are multiple flavors with important differences) apply game theory and
economic analysis to explain and predict when self-interested states54 will
choose cooperation through international law, and international institutions.
5
52. See generally John Witt, supra note 18, at 325-350.
53. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
54. As one rationalist theorist puts it: "States are assumed to be rational, self-interested, and able
to identify and pursue their interests .... States do not concern themselves with the welfare of other states
but instead seek to maximize their own gains or payoffs." ANDREW T. GuzMAN, How INTERNATIONAL LAW
WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY 17 (2008).
55. See Richard H. Steinberg & Jonathan M. Zasloff, Power and International Law, 100 AM. J.
INT'L L. 64, 79 (2006) [hereinafter Steinberg & Zasloff] ("Political scientists began using rationalism to
identify means by which international law could facilitate cooperation that would otherwise not occur. Some
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The traditional histories of U.S. foreign affairs law might seem like the perfect
fodder for these sorts of theories. Focusing on the decisions between
compliance and non-compliance, between joining treaties and spurning them,
these histories would seem to provide the perfect cases for testing and honing
rationalist predictions.56 As David Golove has pointed out, however, without
a better understanding of historical context, rationalists might misidentify the
actual choices made and might misconstrue cooperation as non-compliance.57
A dispute between two states, ripped from its larger context, may look to a
rationalist like an international law failure. At times, however, historical
context may minimize the dispute, revealing the incident as a good faith
argument over how to apply a rule to which both states are committed.5" The
dispute itself may be the proof and product of a longer cooperative
relationship.59 Proper rationalist modeling thus requires a fuller understanding
of American engagement with that rule and that state.
The role these cultural and intellectual histories can play with regard to
liberal international theory is far more obvious. Liberal international theory
"opens the black box of the state and considers the role of substate actors. 60
Liberalism suggests that "state interests are best understood as an aggregation
and intermediation of individual interests. Sources of power and interests are
found within and between states. International law is driven from the bottom
up."' These histories, drawing the linkages between mercantile interests and
the Constitution,62 domestic rights advocates and the international peace
movement,63 New Dealers and the United Nations,' can help liberal theorists
to explore the mechanisms through which domestic interests lead to
international action.
However, constructivism benefits the most from these types of history.
Constructivist theories of international law suggest that state interests and state
early work showed how simple games could be used as metaphors for the kinds of cooperation problems that
could be solved by international organizations and international law.").
56. See JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITsOF INTERNATIONAL LAW 45-82 (2005).
57. Golove, supra note 21, at 350, 376.
58. See id. at 375 ("[A] fuller understanding of the circumstances reveals that the United States had
many compelling reasons to alter its position on these legal questions and that the opposite claim---that the
United States was fully justified in changing its position is at least equally plausible.").
59. See id. at 350-76 (discussing dispute over neutral shipping rules during the American Civil
War).
60. Guzman, supra note 54, at 18.
61. Steinberg & Zasloff, supra note 55, at 81.
62. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
63. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
64. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
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identity are not constant but are instead "constructed" through legal rules,
interaction with other states, and the activities of individuals and advocacy
groups. "Constructivism asks how norms evolve and how identities are
constituted, analyzing, among other things, the role of identity in shaping
political action and the mutually constitutive relationship between agents and
structures."6 5 "International law may be understood as both a reflection of
identities and interests of the powerful, and as a social artifact that reinforces
identities, interests, and power."66 Constructivism thus dovetails well with the
intellectual and cultural histories here. Like these histories, it seeks to trace the
origins of particular international and domestic ideas, to understand how
Americans came to perceive international law in particular ways and how
particular international law rules and ideas have helped shape American
interests and identity. Both these histories and constructivist theory explore the
mechanisms through which ideas are transferred between individuals, states,
and the international system, when ideas will be accepted and assimilated and
when they will be opposed.
One difficulty in studying international law from a constructivist point of
view is that developments in international law and perceptions of international
norms may be overdetermined. At least with relatively contemporary events,
it may be very difficult to isolate the real reasons why perceptions of
international law rules change.67 There are too many actors and too many
variables. Here, these cultural and intellectual histories can help. The passage
of time may help clarify the mechanisms involved; the relative importance of
different events and individuals may emerge-as each of these histories
suggest.
Though the main concern with constructivist approaches is that they yield
few of the comprehensive models or predictions that are normally the hallmark
of social science theories.6" The theory's embrace of complexity, something it
shares with history, makes prediction difficult. Although a number of
constructivist theories have been advanced, it is difficult to imagine a
comprehensive model of norm change that can predict with precision the
65. Oona A. Hathaway & Ariel N. Lavinbuk, Book Review: Rationalism and Revisionism in
International Law, 119 HARV. L. REv. 1404, 1411 (2006).
66. Steinberg & Zasloff, supra note 55, at 82.
67. Margaret E. McGuinness, Medellin, Norm Portals, and the Horizontal Integration of
International Human Rights, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 755, 766-67 (2006) ("Constructivism may tell us
something about global processes and interactions at a macro level, but to the critics offers little help in
predicting how a norm shift-for example from toleration of the death penalty to abolition-will take
place.").
68. Id. at 766. ("The central critique ofconstructivism is that it is insufficiently concrete or specific,
and thus fails to provide an effective framework through which to make causal predictions of state behavior
and/or to design a blueprint for regimes or strategies for addressing human rights violations.").
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different positions states will take with regard to international law.69 But the
similarities between constructivism and history suggest that the criticism is ill-
placed. History too yields few predictive models, but is rarely criticized for that
fact.7" We simply understand that the historical inquiry is different from that
in the social sciences, one more concerned with explaining and understanding
than with simplifying and predicting. Putting aside for the moment the
potential emergence of a comprehensive constructivist model of state behavior,
constructivists may be best served by allying themselves more closely with
cultural and intellectual historians like those on this panel. Historians are
already experts in constructivist-like inquiries, drawing narratives of causation
and influence out of seemingly incoherent, impossibly complex snapshots of
history, and weighing the importance of individuals and moments. Together
with constructivist theorists of international law, they can work to try to
understand the complex history of international law ideas and the complex ways
in which they have interacted with American domestic politics and self-identity.
V. CONCLUSION
This panel highlights some of the cutting edge historical work being done
on the intellectual and cultural history of American perspectives on
international law. Hopefully, it can also serve as a call to arms for other
scholars of international and American foreign affairs law, demonstrating the
real value of engagement with this sort of history.
69. See Guzman, supra note 54, at 20 ("[T]his flexibility makes it difficult for constructivism to
produce a general and tractable theory of state behavior.").
70. Though partisans of social science have at times been known to do so.
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